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BY THE REV. WM. WEBER.
THE accession of the present German emperor to the throne,
or rather Prince Bismarck's dismissal, marks a new era in the
political life of Germany. The people of the fatherland have since
then generally learned to see that their empire, in order to remain
and to become one of the leading powers of the world, must grow
considerably both in territory and population. At the same time
Captain A. T. Mahan's book on The Influence of Sea-Power Upon
History has done more than any other single factor to call the
attention of the Germans to the extraordinary advantages which
transmarine enterprises have offered in the past, and has greatly
assisted in converting a nation, that only a short while ago ridiculed
their advocates of transmarine expansion as colonial cranks, into
ardent expansionists. This is the more remarkable, as the colo-
nial aspirations of the Germans, so far at least as they have as-
sumed definite shape in the public mind, are opposed to certain
vital interests of the United States and have threatened to bring
about a war between the two countries.
In attempting to point out these aspirations to my fellow-
citizens, I have to state beforehand that I am not in possession of
any state-secrets. All I have to communicate are ideas that have
been publicly discussed by more or less prominent writers in the
press of the fatherland. They were little heeded on this side of the
Atlantic and have come into the foreground only of late when the
time seemed ripe for action. I likewise know that those men, though
influential in the highest circles, by no means exercise any direct
influence upon the foreign policy of the German Empire. The fact
ought never to be lost sight of that public opinion in Germany does
not control the actions of the government to such an extent as with
us. German statesmen are not necessarily compelled by popular
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clamor to pursue a course which is in their opinion against the best
interests of their country, nor will they thereby be induced to act
before they are sure that the proper time has arrived and all prep-
arations have been finished. Nevertheless, in Germany as every-
where else, the men at the helm have to consider public opinion
carefully and will endeavor to satisfy its hopes and expectations, if
possible.
In order to form a fair and appropriate judgment on Germany's
colonial aspirations we have first of all to understand her home
conditions. For that purpose we shall compare the German Empire,
with regard to area, population, and past development, with the
other great powers, namely, the United States, Great Britain, and
Russia.
The German Empire has an area of 208,670 square miles, while
the area of the United States comprises not less than 3,501,000
square miles, not to speak of her recent acquisitions. The popula-
tion of Germany amounted in i8go to 49,428,470, or 236.7 per
square mile; whereas the inhabitants of the United States in i8go
numbered 62,622,250, or 21.3 per square mile. The population of
the territories which are at present included in the German Empire
was 24,831,396 in 1816, when the total population of the United
States was about eight millions. The exact figures for the census
of 1810 and 1820 are 7,239,881 and 9,633,822.
In 1816 the population of European descent in the United
Kingdom and its dependencies amounted to about eighteen millions.
On account of the bloody Napoleonic wars which were waged be-
tween 181 1 and 1816 Germany's population must have been about
the same in 1816 as in 1811, that is, about twenty-five millions. In
1890 however the European inhabitants of Greater Britain had be-
come equal in number to those of the German Empire. But those
forty-nine millions of Englishmen controlled an area of 11,371,391
square miles and more than three hundred and eighty millions of
dependent people.
The same thing is to be observed in Russia. That country
had in 1815 a population of forty-five millions, which had increased
in 1896 to one hundred and twenty nine millions. The area at the
disposal of the Russians is 8,660,394 square miles.
The preceding figures show that Germany, about eighty years
ago, had thrice as many inhabitants as the United States, almost
one third more than the British Empire, and fully five-ninths as
many as Russia. In the course of little over seventy years the
United States have become almost one fourth more populous than
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Germany, the British Empire has equalled it, and Russia's popula-
tion has grown to be a good deal more than twice that of Germany.
Moreover, that development has only entered upon its initial stages.
The extensive and fertile domains of the United States, the density
of whose population was not quite one eleventh of that of Germany
in 1890, invite and foster a much more rapid increase in population
than the overcrowded corners of the fatherland. The British Em-
pire as well as Russia enjoy the same conditions. A very great
part of the British colonies offers splendid homes to European
emigrants, and the development of Canada and Australia for in-
stance can hardly be said to have fairly started. There can be no
doubt that the English-European population of Greater Britain will
continue to grow steadily and leave that of the German Empire far
behind. In like manner there is no conceivable limit for a con-
tinuous growth of the number of Russia's inhabitants who are still
sparsely scattered over an immense territory. The inevitable re-
sult of this comparison is—and it may be added that it is well rec-
ognised in Germany itself—that the United States, Great Britain,
and Russia will in the coming century number their populations of
European descent by hundreds of millions; and that the German
Empire, unless the natural course of events is yet to be changed in
favor of Germany, so to speak in the eleventh hour, will cease to
be a first-class power and to exercise political influence beyond the
pale of its narrow boundaries. Nay, even Germany's political inde-
pendence seems to be threatened by her neighbors' growing over-
powerful.
From a German standpoint it does not appear very difficult to
realise such a change in favor of the German Empire. There is
nothing required but to direct the large stream of German emigra-
tion into German colonies, where the German immigrant will pre-
serve his language and customs as well as close commercial and
political connexions with the fatherland. The number of people
that have emigrated from Germany is indeed astonishingly great.
From 1871-1896, in the course of twenty-five years, not less than
2,404,782 Germans have left their countr}', that is, an average of
nearly 100,000 a year. From 1820-1896 the German immigration
into the United States amounted to 5,230,000. These German
immigrants together with their descendants are to-day very probably
equivalent to about fifteen millions of our population. For immi-
grants, as a rule, stand in the prime of their life, and multiply ac-
cordingly much faster than the whole population. Besides our last
census shows very clearly that our foreign-born population has
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more children than our native population. In i8go our native
white population represented 73.24 per cent, of our whole popula-
tion. Our native children of native parents however amounted to
only 54.87 per cent, of our total number of children. Our foreign-
born white population at the same time amounted to 14.56 per
cent, of our whole population, while our children of white foreign-
born parents formed 18.37 per cent. If those five millions of Ger-
man emigrants had therefore founded new homes in German trans-
marine possessions, there would now exist German colonies with
about fifteen million German inhabitants. These were of course to
be added to the European population of the German Empire and to
be deducted from the population of the United States, with the
result that the population of Germany would by far surpass that of
the United States.
It is of course much easier to avoid mistakes than to repair
losses which have been caused by them ; and we should consider it
Germany's first task to obtain possession of territories that present
new homes to her emigrants. But it looks as if Germany had joined
too late in the partition of the earth. She has indeed from 1884-1890
gained control over extensive parts of the dark continent, namely
Togoland, Cameroons, German South-West Africa, and German
East Africa, an area of 920,920 square miles. But the latest statis-
tics accessible to me, those of the Gotliaer Hofkaie/ider, state that in
1897 Togoland had only no, Cameroons 253, German South-West
Africa 2,628, and German East Africa 922 European inhabitants of
all nationalities. It is certainly not encouraging that in a period
of thirteen years Germany has settled in her own colonies only
3,963 European inhabitants, while it has sent during the same time
about a million and a half of Germans to other countries. Some
foreign critics have called attention to this fact as sufficient proof
that Germany does not know how to establish colonies. But Africa
has always and everywhere proved a rather inhospitable continent,
as far as European settlers are concerned. In the French colonies
on the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea the European pop-
ulation is said to be actually decreasing. The Cape Colony at the
southern extremity of the continent had in 1891 an area of 221,311
square miles. Its European population, although the first European
settlement dates back to the year 1652, numbered only 376,987
souls. It has grown since 1875 rather rapidly ; but there is nothing
to warrant the hope that Africa will ever become a white continent.
If the number of Europeans has increased, the number of negroes
has multiplied much more. Accordingly the Germans seem to
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have abandoned all hope and intention of inducing their emigrants
to go to the German possessions in Africa.
The only continents where the necessary room and proper
climate for European agricultural and industrial communities is
found are Australia, South America, and North America. Among
these Australia has received but an insignificant share of Germany's
surplus population. Moreover it belongs to the British Empire,
and Germany would first have to break Great Britain's supremacy
as sea-power, before it could dream of conquering Australia. South
America on the other hand is composed of quite a number of weak
and impotent states which Germany might overpower without any
difficulty ; and North America has always received the lion's share
of German emigration. For these reasons the patriots of Germany
have of late turned their eyes eagerly in the direction of both
North America and South America, with a view to esp^'ing there
an opening for a German colonial empire.
Our census of 1890 showed that there lived in that year not less
than 2,784,894 persons in the United States who were born in Ger-
many, and it has been figured out by statisticians that about one
third of the population of the United States is of German descent.
In view of these facts some Germans deem it possible to carve out
from the present North American dominion of the United States a
German empire. For instance in May 1896 an article appeared in
the well-known Preussische Jahrhiicher on Deiitschland und die W'elt-
politik (Germany's aspirations as a world-power). The author of
that article, after having stated that under present conditions the
Germans in the United States and still more their descendants are
lost as to the fatherland, continues page 328 :
" Those Germans could only be saved, if they had the good sense to unite
in adjoining settlements ; to form one or more German states within the Union, and
to secure thus as one solid body political influence and preserve their nationality.
There is nothing in the constitution of the United States that is in the way of such
an undertaking, nor are they lacking the room. As soon as a leader were found,
the work would become possible. The rest depends upon the future development
which can but result in forcing by and by hostile differences between the states to
the foreground by which the ever more artificial and unnatural unity of the great
republic will be destroyed."
The author goes on to say, page 331 :
"In the British Dominion of Canada of to-day there live about 1,300,000
Frenchmen, and of 211 representatives of the Canadian Parliament not less than 55
are Frenchmen by descent and language. Besides, the attempted revolts of 1S38,
i86g, and 1SS5 have proved that this French population has by no means lost con-
sciousness of its past and its national rights. If thereto be added those Frenchmen
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who to the number of about 500,000 live scattered, but as Frenchmen, in the United
States, there exists in case of a French-English coniiict a reserve of French strength
upon which a resolute French policy can build with hope of success. Then how-
ever the moment would have arrived when it should be the task of Germany, in
co-operation with France whose sphere of influence would be the eastern half of
British America, to attempt to gain a foothold from the west in the regions on the
Pacific Ocean and to try whether it be impossible to arouse the two and three-quarter
millions of Germans in the United States from their 'national lethargy,' and to in-
duce them to lay with the assistance of the fatherland on British ground the founda-
tion of a colony on the Pacific Ocean."
We ma}^ be inclined to smile indulgently at such wild flights of
the imagination which to Americans demonstrate nothing but an
encyclopaedic want of acquaintance with American conditions. But
such vague ideas represent according to all appearance the ripest
public opinion in Germany about the United States, otherwise they
would never have been published in the Preussische Jahrbiicher.
Their author, who signs as "Vindex," is very likely a member of
the class of high government officers in Germany, because a writer
occupying a private station would never have thought of hiding his
individuality behind a pseudonym. We are therefore also unable
to decide in how far those views are shared by the German govern-
ment. In any case we shall do well neither to despise nor to over-
look such significant utterances.
Only recently a Frenchman, M. Francis Laur, is reported to
have made in all earnest a similar prophecy about the future of the
United States. I quote from Tlie Literary Digest of July 15, 1899,
as follows :
" The concentration of Germans in the Northern States will form there a Ger-
man Empire. The French in the South will join together and form a kingdom of
Orleans. And who knows whether the Chinese of the Pacific coast may not ask
for the protection of the Celestial Empire ? Then too we shall see Mexico retake
the provinces torn from her in the time of her weakness. The poor Indians too
will aspire perhaps after well-won independence."
"All this," is added by the editor of TJie Literary Digest, "is
not from a humorous journal, but is put forth as a genuine deduc-
tion from sociological premises." Even the best educated scholars
and men of affairs in Europe are from their European experiences
absolutely unable to see in the people of the United States a
homogeneous nation, striving after a common national ideal. In
their eyes we are nothing but an agglomeration of individuals, dif-
fering from one another in nationality, language, customs, etc., and
being ready to cut each other's throats at the least provocation.
Such forecasts on the political development of the United
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States are the excrescence rather of prejudice than of ignorance.
The nations of continental Europe, France included which is but
a republic in name, do not believe in fostering personal indepen-
dence. The initiative and control in all public, and to a great ex-
tent even in private, affairs, belongs to the State that is, to the
ruler and his officers. If the}' for example wish to found a colony,
they send there first of all an imperial governor with a large staff
of officials and a military force in order to establish in the would-be
colony law and order, peace and security, and regulate commerce
and land-tenure, long before a single actual settler has arrived.
This paternal care for their subjects goes to very great lengths.
They openly prevent ambitious people from emigrating to their
newly acquired territories, until the government officials have dis-
covered by careful observation and scientific experiments not only
that the climate is not hostile to colonisation, but also what agri-
cultural products are best raised, and how the land is to be culti-
vated to that end, etc. Accordingly there remains nothing else to
be done by the colonist but to faithfully follow and obey the advice
and orders of the government.
Such ideas are cherished as infallible truth by the brightest
and most prominent men of continental Europe ; and we cannot
fail to perceive that they must be looked upon as such by monarchs
and their bureaucracy. They prove their laison d'etre and inspire
them with a high and edifying sense of their own necessity and in-
dispensability. On the other hand, they cannot help looking upon
a commonwealth like the United States where the individual ap-
pears to recognise no other authority than his own sweet will, and
which seems to be torn by internal dissentions, with the deepest
distrust and the most gloomy forebodings. Their honest convic-
tion concerning our present and future development is best ex-
pressed by citing Milton's description of the realm of Chaos:
"To whom these most adhere
He rules a moment ; Chaos umpire sits,
And by decision more embroils the fray
By which he reigns ; next him high arbiter
Chance governs all.—This wild abyss,
The womb of nature and perhaps her grave.
Of neither sea, nor shore, nor air, nor fire,
But all these in their pregnant causes mixed
Confusedly, and which thus must ever fight,
Unless the Almighty Maker them ordain
His dark materials to create more worlds."
Of such prejudices, which nothing but time can remove, we
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must not for a moment lose sight, in our dealings with the powers
of continental Europe. We must know that by presenting them a
weak and unprotected side we invite their attack, because, very
far from realising our immense strength and abounding resources,
thfy are unable to imagine us otherwise than rotten to the core.
Still it is rather on account of their curiosity that I have men-
tioned the hopes on which German patriots base their ideas of the
political attitude and the "national duty," as they call it, of the
German element in the United States. Those expectations are cer-
tainly extravagant and will never be fulfilled. Their South American
plans however are to be taken quite seriously. For it is there that
the Germans confidently expect to acquire their first colonies. Of
the German emigrants that did not come to the United States the
greatest part went to Brazil. Their number has indeed not been
very large. For, while from 1871 1896 the total emigration from
Germany to the United States has been 2,370,958, only 48,444 set-
tled in Brazil. Besides the number of German immigrants into
Brazil, as into all other South American Republics, has always been
much smaller than the number of Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish
immigrants. But most Germans going to Brazil settled in the
three southern States of Parana, Santa Catharina, and Rio Grande
do Sul. These three States, which have an area of more than
200,000 square miles, are almost as large as the German Empire
itself. Their population amounted in 1890 to about one and one-half
million. Although the Germans formed less than one fourth of this
sum, people in Germany thought and think it possible to give them
within a few years a majority by directing the whole stream of their
emigrants to those states. That looks quite feasible as a simple
problem of arithmetic. For Germany has sent for many years an-
nually 100,000 emigrants to transmarine countries.
To this end the German Diet passed in 1897 a new emigration
bill, which became a law on the first of April 189S. Of this emigra-
tion law Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia of 1897 states:
" The Government carried through an emigration bill in furtherance of its
policy to deflect the stream of emigration from the United States to countries of
South and Central America, where large agricultural and industrial colonies will
develop autonomous institutions, preserve their language and customs, and pre-
serve a commercial and political connection with the fatherland; or to the Trans-
vaal or other regions where the colonists can advance the political prestige of the
empire
;
as far as possible also to German transmarine possessions. Companies
undertaking to settle such colonies will be aided by grants of money and by political
protection wherever required. Such a company was organised in Hamburg to take
over a tract of 1,700,000 fertile acres in the Brazilian state of Catharina, with a
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railroad leading to the German colonies already established there. I\>rmission to
transport German emigrants will have to be obtained after April i, 1S98, from the
German Chancellor, acting with the assent of the Federal Council, and can only be
granted to German subjects or companies operating in German territory. A license
granted to a navigation company or emigration agent can be cancelled by the same
authorities. The bill provides that consuls shall be appointed in ports of debarka-
tion approved by the Government to protect the interests of emigrants ; that the
Government shall facilitate the discharge of their military obligations by Germans
living abroad; that an official bureau of information shall be instituted to direct
the stream of emigration to territories where the conditions are favorable for pros-
perity, and where there is the best prospect of the German nationality being per-
petuated and relations to the mother country being maintained."
Geographical conditions greatly favor the German plan in
Southern Brazil. The states of Parana, Santa Catharina, and Rio
Grande do Sul form a kind of spur extending southward away from
the solid mass of the empire. Means of inland communication are
little developed. There is no road passable by wagons connecting
the three southern states with the north ; especially Parana is cov-
ered with mountains. All intercourse is carried on at present by
sea. If therefore Germany should be opposed alone by Brazil,
when making an attempt upon Southern Brazil, she could with her
powerful navy easily prevent the Brazilians from coming to the aid
of their oppressed countrymen; whereas she herself would be ab-
solutely unhampered in transporting thither all the soldiers and all
the material of war she wanted.
The German settlers in Southern Brazil or at least some of
their spiritual and intellectual leaders, do not appear to be averse to
such ideas. Towards the end of i8g6 and in the beginning of 1897
several papers, written by Rev. Dr. Rotermund of Sao LeopoldO;
R. G. D. S., on the " Prospects of the German Element in Southern
Brazil," were published in \\\e Deutsche Post. The author declared
in the course of his discussions for instance :
"The statement that we wish to preserve our nationality does not mean any-
thing. The Status Quo cannot be maintained for any length of time. Here also
it is an "either—or ; " either the Germans agree to being absorbed or they absorb
whatever suits them ; hammer or anvil ! We have made our choice long ago ; it
only remains to look steadfast at the goal ! A German South Brazil ! "
He further says :
"We have given our articles the heading : ' The Prospects of the Germans in
Southern Brazil,' and that not alone, because we Germans have our main strength
in the three southern states, but also, because these three states, as we think, will
not stay united with Brazil for ever. Their secession from Brazil can but be a
question of time." " We are able to observe quite distinctly how love for one's own
state is growing at the expense of Brazil's unity ; and we should not wonder, when,
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especially in consequence of the maladministration at the federal capital, Parana,
Santa Catharina, and Rio Grande Do Sul should some day declare for secession
and independence. Then however a new outlook will be opened to the Germans.'
The United States have certainly neither a right nor the least
desire to become entangled in the internal affairs of any South
American Republic. If in South America any number of states or
provinces should deem fit to renounce their present allegiance in
order to form an independent republic of their own, the United
States would as a matter of course recognise the new republic, as
soon as it had firmly established its independence. The United
States will likewise under no circumstances trouble themselves
about the language an independent South American Republic may
prefer. The present Brazilian states of Parana, Santa Catharina,
and Rio Grande Do Sul may therefore, as far as the United States
are concerned, sever their connexion with Brazil at any time they
choose and prove able to do so. They may enter into a league
with one another and, as the Germans think possible, with the
Republics of Paraguay and Uruguay. They may even compel the
Argentine Republic to give up its provinces east of the river Parana,
so-called " Mesopotamia Argentina," and to permit them to join the
new republic, which is perfectly entitled to adopt the German lan-
guage as its public language, if a majority of its citizens decides in
favor of such an important change.
Yet it is more than doubtful whether the German settlers in
Southern Brazil will ever become numerous enough to gain control
of their states in the manner which has just been described, and
which has been defined as perfectly legitimate from the standpoint
of the United States. It is indeed only a question of numbers, and
Germany is absolutely able to pour a continuous stream of emigrants
at the rate of 100,000 per annum into the three Brazilian states and
the neighboring republics, Paraguay, Uruguay, etc. But those
countries are under present conditions not capable of absorbing and
accommodating so great a multitude of new arrivals. It is very dif-
ficult for people that have never been outside of Europe to under-
stand the reasons why those regions cannot at a moment's notice
feed and clothe and house any number of "greenhorns." They will
answer all objections by the following calculation : In Germany
there are more than 250 persons to the square mile. In Parana you
find only 2.9, in Santa Catharina 10.3, and in Rio Grande Do Sul
9.7. Hence there is plenty of room for hundreds of thousands of
colonists in those countries. While that has to be admitted as
true, practical experience has nevertheless demonstrated that, if
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vacant land and people willing to settle there are given, it requires
first of all proper means of communication and sufficient centers of
trade and industry to fill the vacant land with prosperous home-
steads. One hundred thousand German emigrants dumped upon
the shores of Southern Brazil in a single year without the most
careful and expensive preparation for their immediate accommoda-
tion would unfailingly ruin the labor-market of that country as well
as the market for all agricultural and industrial products and cause
untold misery. Accordingly the German Government will hardly
dare send all its emigrants to Southern Brazil; and I should not
be surprised the least bit, if after a while statistics should demon-
strate that the relative proportion of German colonists to that of
Latin settlers in Southern Brazil as well as elsewhere in South
America has not materially changed. Then however Germany may
be strongly tempted to seize by force of arms what it cannot obtain
in peaceful competition; and that is the moment when the United
States will have to take a lively interest in Germany's colonial
policy.
The United States are very proud of their Monroe Doctrine,
which represents a solemn promise never to permit any European
power to encroach on the South and Central American Republics,
and especially to establish new European dependencies on American
soil. The simple proclamation of this doctrine proved sufficient to
deter the H0I3' Alliance from making any attempt to restore the
rule of the Bourbons over the Spanish-American Republics. The
same doctrine, backed by the veteran army and navy of the Civil
War, compelled Napoleon III. to renounce his intention to set up
the Austrian prince Maximilian as emperor of Mexico and to with-
draw his troops from Mexico. It was the Monroe Doctrine that
guided President Cleveland's conduct, when he sent his ultimatum
in the Venezuela controversy to England. In view of such prece-
dents it is not to be doubted for a moment that, whenever the Ger-
man Empire shall stretch out its mailed hand for the purpose of
laying hold on South American territory, the United States would
enter the lists as the champion of South American independence.
No American administration could hesitate to take up this task.
The people of Germany are not unacquainted with these facts.
As soon as the South American projects were publicly discussed,
even before the emigration bill was passed, the Monroe Doctrine
became the object of intense interest. The German newspapers
hastened to proclaim that the Monroe Doctrine had never been
adopted as a principle of international law, either by Germany
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or by any other European power, and that consequently none of
them was bound by it. Of Prince Bismarck it was related that he
had called the Monroe Doctrine a piece of sheer impudence. As
late as July 15, 1899, a German writer declares in an article on Die
natkviale Aufgabe der Deutschamerikaner (the national duties of Ger-
man-Americans), published in the Gegcnwart of Berlin :
"The famous and impudent Monroe Doctrine the Yankees have renounced on
their own initiative by overstepping the boundaries of a policy strictly confined to
America, and by inaugurating an aggressive imperialistic policy the consequences
of which cannot yet be overlooked."
Another German paper criticised the phrase "America for the
Americans," saying that the United States mean "the whole of
America for the North Americans," suggesting that it ought to be
changed into "North America for the North Americans."
The long and the short of it is that the Monroe Doctrine is in
fact not a universally recognised principle of international law, but
simply and exclusively a question of might. It means that the
United States want the new world reserved for the republican form
of government; they would regard it as a threat to their own insti-
tutions, if some monarchical power of Europe should establish it-
self on American soil, and thus they declared that they would re-
gard such an attempt as a hostile act and a menace to their own
safety. The political pretensions of the United States defined in
the Monroe Doctrine will be respected just so long as the United
States are resolved and able to prove and demonstrate the good
right of their pretensions by force of arms.
In this connexion we must not neglect to notice that the re-
markable increase of Germany's naval armament is in the popular
German mind intimately related to the colonial aspirations of the
empire. The public demand for a stronger German navy arose
indeed immediately after the Emperor had despatched his famous
telegram to Oom Paul of the Transvaal. That the German Em-
peror had helped to twist the British Lion's tail so audaciously
rendered him at once very popular among Germans the world
over. But when Great Britain assembled a squadron of mighty
warships in the English Channel, it became all at once clear that
Germany, notwithstanding her powerful army, was no match for
England. Then the Germans grew loud in their clamor for a larger
navy. Everywhere public collections were instituted with the in-
tention of presenting men-of-war to the government. Some time
however elapsed, before the German government had worked out
its plan and could lay a naval bill before the Diet.
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES. 6ll
Meanwhile international conditions had somewhat altered.
The first enthusiasm for the political independence of the Boers or
rather for the idea of bringing South Africa, the English colonies
included, where a majority of the European population is of Dutch
and German descent, under the paramount influence of the Ger-
man Empire had cooled off considerably, if it had not entirely sub-
sided. Great Britain and Germany had reapproached and come
to terms, as was publicly demonstrated by the German annexation
of Kiao Chau Bay in 1897 when the German war-ships on their
way to China were furnished with coal at the British coaling sta-
tions. The attention of the Germans had been called away from
Africa, perhaps b}' the English themselves who immediately after
the \'enezuela Message could not entertain too friendly feelings
towards the United States, to the advantages offered to German
colonial enterprises by the conditions in South America. But while
the prospect of South American colonies was appearing above the
horizon, the spectre of North American interference loomed threat-
eningly in the background. The increase in naval armament which
the German government demanded and obtained from the Diet
accordingly provided for a navy that was to be stronger, not than
the navy of Great Britain, France, or Russia respectively, but
than the navy of the United States. In the spring of 1898, imme-
diately before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the
naval bill was passed. It authorised the construction of a navy,
which was to be completed within a term of six years, that is, by
1904, and was to consist of 19 battle-ships, 8 armored coast-defense
vessels, 9 first-class cruisers, 26 second-class cruisers, and of a re-
serve of 2 battle-ships, 3 first-class cruisers, 4 second-class cruisers,
together with quite a number of gunboats and torpedo-vessels.
Hand in hand with building the ships was to go a corresponding
increase in the personnel of the navy. In 1897 the personnel con-
sisted of 960 officers and engineers, 5,069 petty officers, and 15,592
men and boys, making a total of 21,835 n^en, including surgeons,
paymasters, etc. The total of the personnel of the United States
navy in the same year amounted to but 13,659 men. But hardly six
months having passed, cries for a still greater naval armament be-
came loud in Germany. This time they want a navy which is to
comprise not less than 57 battle-ships, 15 first-class cruisers, and
36 second-class cruisers. This immense number of warships, which
would make the German Empire by a single stroke the foremost
naval power of the world, is to be built from 1904-1920 at a cost of
$425,000,000 and an annual naval budget of $75,000,000. They also
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propose to accomplish that end without having recourse to addi-
tional taxation.
What is the meaning of such almost unlimited warlike prepa-
ration ? The German Emperor some time ago told American vis-
itors that his strong navy is to serve the same end as his large
army, namely, the preservation of peace. These imperial words
however have to be construed in the light of historical facts. The
German army never was intended simply as an instrument of peace.
It was in the first place organised by Gneisenau for the war of in-
dependence against Napoleon I., and reorganised through William
I. under the auspices of men like Bismiarck, Moltke, and Roon.
While it was still the army of Prussia, it conquered an adequate
position for the kingdom of Prussia, first among the German states
and next among the nations of Europe. It fought in pursuance of
this its task many a bloody battle. No one can blame Germany,
for the policy of conquest was forced on the nation by circum-
stances. But, having obtained what the army had been created
for, it became necessary to preserve the peace of Europe, that is
to say, to guard and keep what Germany had gained in war, if
possible, by the mere existence and ever watchful readiness of the
German army or, if need be, by crushing the bold aggressor on the
field of battle.
The German Empire has up to the present time not made any
transmarine conquests which could arouse the envy and revengeful
hatred of other powers so that they would have to be guarded and
defended by a strong navy. Its geographical position in Europe is
such that Germany can keep her own without the assistance of
numerous warships, as was convincingly illustrated in the course
of the Franco-Prussian war. Although the French in that war
were in possession of a navy in comparison with which the few
Prussian war-vessels were insignificant, they were powerless against
the German sea-coast and had very soon to recall their ships from
their blockade-stations off the German harbors in order to employ
both marines and sailors in the defense of their native soil. The
only explanation which under these circumstances the extra-
ordinary efforts of Germany to secure a first class navy admit of is
that they evidently intend to overawe, when occasion offers, any
opponent the empire may encounter, while it pursues its course of
national aggrandisement in countries lying beyond the sea.
Having arrived at this conclusion, we shall find it to our ad-
vantage to briefly recapitulate what we have learned about the
straits and aspirations of the German Empire. We behold Ger-
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man}^ confronted by the desperate problem, a mere question of self-
preservation, how to maintain its present standing and rank among
the nations of the world. Being in desperate circumstances, we
may look for desperate actions from her. For the chances are that
she will be left behind in the race forever for want of elbow room.
We find even the general public of Germany aware of these condi-
tions, and her statesmen and lawgivers seeking for new countries
suitable for propagating the fertile German race and arming their
warriors to snatch these countries away from any possessor and de-
fender. We can but sympathise heartily with their eager resolution
and strong efforts to turn the tide of events. We may even, as strong
and healthy men, rejoice at the prospect of the gigantic struggle
between Germany and the power which will be caught standing in
her way. But we must not be unmindful of the ominous fact that
the United States may be and in all probability is that power with
which Germany will fight for life and death.
Present conditions may of course change at any time. Ger-
many may after all decide to seek in the future as in her glorious
past, expansion by land, namely, in Europe, Asia Minor, Syria, etc.
This seems to us the wiser course which promises success. The
Germans in the Austrian Empire are threatened in their national-
ity by their Czechic, Polish and other compatriots. The death of
Francis Joseph which may occur at any moment may unchain there
a revolution that will give ample employment to Germany's sur-
plus energy and recall her from a wild-goose chase across the At-
lantic Ocean. There are indications too that Great Britain is more
than willing to welcome the German Empire not alone as the right-
ful heir of the House of Hapsburg, but also of the sick man at Con-
stantinople. The present German ambassador at Washington who
is favorably known for his clear insight and sound judgment has
also in all probability supplied his government with the necessary
information as to the inadvisability of its colonial policy in both
Americas. Still it behooves us as prudent and cautious men to
arrange betimes for the proper safe-guards, lest we should be in-
volved in a dangerous war at a moment when we are least prepared
for it.
A war with Germany would be the greatest misfortune that
possibly could befall us, and ought to be roidered impossible. A very
large percentage of our adopted and native citizens are of German
descent and would in such a war very naturally vacillate in their
sympathies between their old and their new country. In our opin-
ion even a higher percentage of German-Americans would stand by
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the stars and stripes in case of war with Germany than ever Eng-
lish-Americans did in war conflicts with Cireat Britain ; but their
loyalty would be suspected, and that would result in bitter re-
criminations. Modern German immigration into the United States
before 1870 was quite different from what it has been since that
year. The great bulk of German immigrants has indeed always
been impelled by purely economical considerations to leave their
native land. But their intellectual leaders in the period before the
Franco-Prussian War were confirmed republicans, even before they
arrived here. Since the establishment of the German Empire,
however, the educated Germans that have come to this country as
a rule no longer believe in a republican form of government. That
may, for instance, be learned from the article on "The Germans
and the Americans" by Hugo Munsterberg in the September num-
ber of The Atlantic Monthly. He declares, page 406
:
" If I say that I have never been a more thoroughgoing monarchist than during
my stay in America, I can really not claim to be an exception."
It would lead us too far, if we shouid attempt to explain that
phenomenon. For our purposes it is sufficient to point out the fact
that it requires, so to speak, a special education, an intimate ac-
quaintance with our national history, and a vivid consciousness of
our national destiny to render educated Germans that have lately
settled among us true Americans. As long as they look upon mon-
archy as the best form of government, they will fail to perceive
that it can at all be our duty to prevent the German Empire from
propagating their monarchical system in South America, and will
accordingly oppose such a policy on the part of the United States
to the best of their ability.
The only and best as well as cheapest means to ward off all
that trouble consists in keeping our navy always and in every re-
spect, in number and quality of ships, in armament, in personnel,
in discipline and training, well abreast, if not ahead, of the German
navy.
Our Spanish war ought to have taught each one of us at least
one thing, namely that the old adage is still as true as ever. Si vis
pacem, para bellum. If we had had a stronger navy, before the war
broke out, Spain would have surrendered Cuba for a reasonable
cash indemnity without drawing the sword ; and we should have
been saved all our trouble with the Philippine Islands, so loudly
lamented by our anti-expansionists.
An imperfect, unfinished warlike armament will always tend to
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produce war. As the conditions were, all European countries,
with perhaps the sole exception of Great Britain, confidently be-
lieved and predicted that the United States, although probably
victorious at the end, would suffer severe reverses at the beginning.
Germany was so strongly convinced of the weakness of both bel-
ligerents that she ordered almost her whole Asiatic squadron to
Manila Bay in order to be ready to protect her interests in those
regions herself. To avoid such and similar occurrences in future,
to uphold our national dignity, to secure prompt recognition of our
national rights, and to preserve internal peace, we are in urgent
need of a navy strong and powerful enough and ever ready to meet
on favorable terms any foreign power that may be forced by sheer
despair to risk a war with us, as long as there is the least hope of
success.
